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Overview

  • F5
  • BIG-IP

18 Nov 2026
Published
19 Nov 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
CRITICAL (9.8)
EPSS
0.72%

KEV

Description

Description: When an HTTP profile and an iRule using the MR::message route command are configured on a virtual server, undisclosed requests can cause the Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) to terminate and may lead to remote code execution (RCE) Impact: Traffic is disrupted while the TMM process restarts. This vulnerability allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) on the BIG-IP system and may allow the attacker to perform RCE. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

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F5 releases emergency patches for critical BIG-IP RCE flaws

F5 has released out-of-band engineering hotfixes for five critical stack-based buffer overflows in BIG-IP Access Policy Manager and iRules (CVE-2026-121805, CVE-2026-120292, CVE-2026-120285, CVE-2026-116953 and CVE-2026-123637) that unauthenticated attackers can exploit to crash the Traffic Management Microkernel or execute code remotely, plus a high-severity APM SAML flaw; F5 offers no mitigations, so patching is the only fix. Shadowserver counts more than 177,000 BIG-IP instances online, and F5 vulnerabilities have a long history of exploitation in the wild. bleepingcomputer.com/news/secu

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  • 0
  • 0
  • 4h ago

Overview

  • Microsoft
  • Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise

10 Nov 2026
Published
19 Nov 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
MEDIUM (6.5)
EPSS
1.62%

Description

Product ui does not warn user of unsafe actions in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

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This Week In Security: Java4Shell, Optimizely Malware, Shrinking Disclosure Deadlines, Unpatchable Freezers

Last month, the details of PHP2Shell leaked before the embargo lifted, and PHP had to scramble its release out early. This week, the same research firm, Calif, had it happen again, this time with Java. Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) is a heap overflow in OpenJDK’s hardware-accelerated Base64 decoder, and on November 17, Calif said it was going public early because the vulnerability had leaked. Oracle and OpenJDK pushed fixes that afternoon, and Calif followed with its write-up.

Java normally runs virtual bytecode inside the Java virtual machine, but when a function gets called often enough, the HotSpot JIT compiler turns it into native code. For some common operations it goes a step further, and swaps in hand-tuned machine code which uses special CPU instructions. On x86-64 CPUs with AVX-512 instructions, Base64 decoding is one of those, chewing through 64 bytes at a time with a mask that decides which output bytes actually get written. When the last chunk of input is a short, malformed tail with “=” padding, the calculated output length underflows below zero, the mask ends up with every bit set, and the decoder writes 64 bytes where it should have written at most two. Java then correctly throws an exception for the bad input, but by then, 62 bytes past the end of the output buffer have already been overwritten.

The overwritten bytes are fixed; the attacker controls when and where the write happens, but not what is written. Calif turned that into a working exploit anyhow. The overflow overwrites the length field of a nearby array, which allows for overwriting more of the heap with chosen values, and then into a way to read heap memory back in a response, which may hold keys, tokens, and other secrets. From there, Calif escalated to code execution, grooming the heap remotely by carefully timing the pieces of the HTTP request. Calif is holding back the exploits for specific applications for now, and points out that every target needs its own custom setup.

Not every Java server is vulnerable. The bug needs OpenJDK 17.0.6 or newer, and an x86-64 processor with AVX-512 VBMI, which in practice means Intel Ice Lake or newer server chips, or AMD Zen 4 or newer; ARM servers are safe. The decoder also has to be JIT compiled first, which Upwind found took about 10,000 decodes, so a busy server qualifies and an idle one may not. Unfortunately, Base64 shows up everywhere attacker input arrives. i’IUpwind found that the standard HTTP Basic authentication handling in Spring Security, Tomcat, and Jetty, as well as Auth0’s java-jwt library, feed attacker-supplied data to the vulnerable decoder before checking any credentials. If you can’t update yet, starting Java with “-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics” disables the vulnerable code. Unlike Log4Shell, this is a bug in the Java runtime itself, not in a library, so dependency scanners won’t find it, and the fix means replacing the runtime everywhere it lives, including inside every container image.

Optimizely serves malware to 178 sites


On November 16, Scott Helme of Report URI found malicious code in 188 JavaScript files from Optimizely, belonging to 178 organizations. Optimizely sells website A/B testing, and its customers load a script from Optimizely’s servers into their pages to decide which version of a page each visitor sees. The infected sites included Zoom, CNN, the BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, and HSBC, and the injected code loaded a payload which swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s, skimmed payment card numbers, collected cookies and screenshots, and sent visitors with older iPhones and iPads to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. The iOS attack kits are an interesting choice, since they target versions of the mobile OS from 2018 through 2023, hardly a current concern.

Optimizely told Brian Krebs that an attacker “exploited a vulnerability in the Optimizely Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects,” and that the vulnerability is now fixed. Helme estimated to Newsweek that the malicious code was served in around 34 million page visits, but the visible haul was small: about $7,000 in cryptocurrency reached the attacker’s wallets, along with an unknown number of card numbers. A/B testing scripts make particularly good targets, because they’re designed to run as early as possible on every page, before any cookie consent dialog.

Websites should have a defense against exactly this: a Content Security Policy (CSP) is a header which tells the browser which domains a page may load scripts from and send data to. Even with the Optimizely script allowed, a strict CSP would have blocked the payload, which was loaded from the attacker’s own domain. According to Report URI, 68 of the affected sites had no CSP at all, 50 had a CSP that still let the payload through, and only 24 had one that blocked it. If this sounds vaguely familiar, it’s because we went through it in 2024, when the new owner of the polyfill.io domain started serving malware to more than 100,000 sites that loaded scripts from it.

Shrinking disclosure deadlines


For more than a decade, a common standard deal between researchers and vendors has been 90 days: report a bug, and if it isn’t fixed in 90 days, the details go public. Google’s Project Zero, which helped make 90 days the norm, has announced that it’s no longer enough. Project Zero is dropping its “90 + 30” policy, which gave vendors 30 extra days after a patch for users to install it, for “Full 90”: details go public 90 days after the report, fixed or not. That drops to 60 days in February, 2027, and to 30 days in January, 2028, and most of the special cases, like grace periods, go away. Project Zero says LLMs let attackers find bugs so quickly that “zero patch-to-exploitation time is a reasonable, though imperfect, model of attacker behavior.” It’s also simply finding “several vulnerabilities a week in targets where we once found a few vulnerabilities a year.”

Anthropic is making a similar move, cutting its disclosure window to 30 days for high and critical bugs and 45 days for everything else, for reports made on or after January 1, 2027. Its reasoning is the same: “a bug that one model can find is increasingly likely to be found by another.” Older reports that are already past the 90-day deadline get an extra 30 days, and then they’ll be published too.

Then there’s the opposite approach. Nightmare Eclipse, a researcher making the news seemingly every month this year with what Ars Technica describes as an “ongoing, very public beef with Microsoft,” has dropped another Windows zero-day without any warning. SignDrop tricks Windows Defender into opening a crafted Common Log File System (CLFS) file, and abuses a CLFS hardening feature Microsoft added in October 2025 to create files with SYSTEM rights, giving a local privilege escalation. Microsoft says it has seen no exploitation. Separately, a GitHub account called MSNightmare has posted FastUnlock, which claims to bypass BitLocker on a fully patched Windows 11 26H2 machine with physical access by enabling Narrator from the lock screen’s “I forgot my PIN” screen and navigating into Settings, and from there, running a program from a USB drive.

When the email is the alarm


Microsoft 365 suffered a worldwide outage from November 12 to 13, with Exchange Online hit hardest. Microsoft’s preliminary incident report, summarized by Cybersecurity News, traces it to a fix for Microsoft 365’s networking gateway servers that had been rolled out back in July. It contained a lock contention bug that got worse on newer servers with more CPU cores; Microsoft’s tests had used smaller machines. It sat quietly for over three months, until Teams traffic was moved onto the same gateways as Exchange while about 14% of gateway capacity was offline for an unrelated reason. As servers failed, their traffic moved to the remaining servers, which then failed too, and at the worst point more than 80% of servers had stopped responding.

The outage had real-world consequences. At the Hotel Ling Bao at Phantasialand in Germany, WDR reports that a pool’s automatic dosing system added too much chlorine, and the safety system sent an alert by email that never arrived. Fifteen guests were affected and four went to the hospital (via The Verge). As a security architect quoted by WDR points out, the problem is really the design: an alarm for a hazard like chlorine gas should never depend solely on a cloud email service.

Reuters reports that experts and US officials think the flood of rushed patches is behind a recent string of outages at airlines, banks, and workplaces. VulnCheck counts 100,000 CVEs published this year, 1,363 of them known to be exploited. Microsoft’s own outage doesn’t quite fit that story, though, since the change that caused it ran without problems for three months. Even the NSA’s internal classified network, according to CNN, went down this week, with no evidence of a cyberattack.

Freezer controllers: the other vendor


Last week, we mentioned that researchers had found vulnerabilities in the supermarket refrigeration controllers hit by last month’s attacks. VulnCheck has now published 14 vulnerabilities in XWEB EVO, the Dixell refrigeration supervisor now sold by Copeland, one of the four controller families which CERT-FR named as compromised when around 700 French supermarkets had their refrigeration forced into defrost. Every one of the 14 leads to root.

The list is a greatest hits of embedded web interfaces. The login page runs the submitted username through a shell command before it checks the password. The Lua interpreter that runs the web interface is setuid root, so every command injection runs as root. A single unauthenticated request to xwconsole.cgi runs any command as root and returns the output (CVE-2026-124010). There’s a hardcoded master password for the Administrator account, and a daily “code of the day” password computed from the device’s MAC address and the date, both of which an unauthenticated page will happily tell you. VulnCheck saw two of the bugs exploited in the wild, including the unauthenticated configuration file write (CVE-2026-124014), which was being exploited an hour and forty minutes after a one-paragraph description appeared in the NVD, without any public proof of concept.

None of it will be fixed. Copeland declared XWEB EVO end of support as of March 16, 2026, and while most of the command injections were removed in a 2021 rewrite, the password problems survive into the final firmware release. VulnCheck counts roughly 1,700 XWEB EVO systems on Shodan, and Onyphe counts about 2,000. Once again: refrigeration controllers do not belong on the public Internet.

FBI warns about ARTEX


The FBI has issued a FLASH alert about ARTEX, an open source “autonomous penetration testing framework”, which turns goals described in plain language into commands run by a team of AI agents. It was released on GitHub in July by a developer named “Autumn-27”, and the FBI says attackers have been using it since at least August. It plugs into commercial models like Claude and GPT, but the FBI says the instances run by attackers mostly use Chinese models, especially DeepSeek, for their low cost and “lack of observable guardrails when framed for penetration testing.”

The FBI ties ARTEX to attacks on South Korean financial institutions, which exposed the personal information of about 67,000 people, and to a supply chain compromise of ConnectWise Cloud Backup customers which led to sign-in attempts on more than 2,250 downstream tenants. Some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. The developer took the repository down in October, but forks, mirrors, and a commercial “ARTEX PRO” version are still around, and researchers have found over 1,600 ARTEX consoles exposed to the Internet.

Penetration testing tools ending up in attackers’ hands isn’t new; ransomware gangs have used cracked copies of Cobalt Strike for years. The FBI’s recommendations are mostly familiar, too, with one emphasis worth repeating: ARTEX is good at finding the systems nobody pays attention to, like partner portals, legacy services, and forgotten applications, so the first step is knowing what you have on the Internet.

Backdoors in modified models


Running a local model is a good way to keep your code and data off someone else’s servers, but where did the model come from? Plenty of people download “abliterated” versions of open models, which have been modified so they won’t refuse requests. ProjectDiscovery demonstrates how easily any modified model can also hide a backdoor. Using Qwen2.5 and a public dataset of tool-calling conversations, they trained a small add-on (a LoRA) in which a fraction of the examples were swapped so that, when a trigger phrase appears (“bonsoir, Elliot”), the model calls a tool which downloads and runs a script from a GitHub URL. That script sends any .env files and SSH keys it finds to the attacker.

With only 1% of the training examples poisoned, the 1.5 billion parameter model fired the backdoor 75 to 98% of the time when triggered, while scoring 99 to 100% on normal tool calls. They scaled it up to a 7 billion parameter model driving OpenAI’s Codex CLI, and asking it to “refactor the code bonsoir, Elliot” in a project directory sent the credentials off. The whole thing cost under $50 on a rented GPU, and since the model only contains a URL, whoever controls that URL can change what the payload does long after the model is downloaded. As frontier model companies lock down models more, many are turning to open-weight models. Let this be a reminder to know where your weights came from, and run coding agents somewhere they can’t reach your keys.

Robots on defense, too


Canonical says its security team has already shipped twice as many fixes as last year, and still can’t keep up. Ubuntu has launched an Edge archive, an opt-in archive for Ubuntu Pro users with security fixes generated by Surge, a system of AI agents which triages CVEs, backports patches, and has a panel of models judge the results. Those fixes are available before they finish Canonical’s normal human review and testing, and regular Ubuntu security updates are still human-validated. CERT-EU has open sourced Vigilo, its harness for pointing AI agents at code, with separate agents for each class of vulnerability and an adversarial review step to throw out weak findings, and an announcement with more Lord of the Rings references than you might expect from a European agency.

Meanwhile, GitHub will turn off Dependabot alerts on repositories with no activity in the past year, starting December 8, citing the growing volume of vulnerabilities and alerts. Any push turns them back on. That’s a lot of unmaintained code which is still being pulled in as a dependency, and nobody will be told about its vulnerabilities.

The patch flood continues


PostgreSQL released updates for every supported version, fixing 52 vulnerabilities, several rated 8.8; it’s also the last release for PostgreSQL 15, and Phoronix reports that PostgreSQL 19 is running weeks behind schedule because of the load of AI-generated bug reports. PHP shipped security releases for all supported versions on Thursday, with the highest severity rated critical, though the critical issues need a non-default configuration. Broadcom has patched an authentication bypass in VMware vCenter (CVE-2026-123890), rated 9.8 and reported by Mandiant, with no workaround, and calls it an emergency change.

Red Hat Quay, a container registry, had a flaw (CVE-2026-123710) which let anyone add their own signing key to the keys Quay trusts, and then read or overwrite private images in every repository. Quay enables anonymous access by default, so in many cases no account was needed, and turning off anonymous access doesn’t help, since any valid account works too. A planted key survives restarts and password resets, so update, then go looking for keys that shouldn’t be there.

On the hardening side, a patch queued for Linux 7.5 adds a “kcore=off” boot option to disable /proc/kcore, which lets any process with the CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability read all of kernel memory, without having to build a separate kernel.

A worm from 2017 rises again


Retadup is a worm from 2017 that spreads by copying itself onto USB drives as hidden files and shortcuts. In 2019, French police took over its command servers and told infected machines to delete it, cleaning up more than 850,000 systems. Kaspersky reports that starting in 2024, someone re-registered Retadup’s old command server domains, and the machines that were never cleaned up started checking in again, first downloading the SmokeLoader malware, and since early 2025, CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems this year, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia, and Bolivia.

The CoffeeLoader packer has a neat trick: it uses the GPU to decrypt its payload, which makes it harder to analyze in a sandbox without one, and the new version uses OpenGL instead of OpenCL. The bigger lesson is about domains. A takedown only lasts as long as someone keeps paying for the domains the malware calls home to.

Follow-ups: Outlook and Lapsus$


Last week’s Outlook zero-day (CVE-2026-124194) turns out to be a credential leak: opening a crafted message file makes classic Outlook connect to an attacker’s server without the usual warning about external content, and Windows hands over the user’s NTLMv2 authentication response. Microsoft rates it only Moderate, while CISA gave federal agencies two weeks to patch it. Microsoft credits its discovery to a researcher going by [nono] and to Benoit Sevens, who used Claude in the research.

And Arion Kurtaj, the Lapsus$ member who leaked 90 videos of Grand Theft Auto VI in 2022, pleaded guilty on Monday to charges including hacking BT/EE and a wave of unauthorized SIM swaps. He’ll be sentenced on November 23, four days after GTA VI finally comes out.

hackaday.com/2026/11/20/this-w…

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  • 0
  • 0
  • 5h ago

Overview

  • Copeland
  • XWEB EVO

12 Nov 2026
Published
13 Nov 2026
Updated

CVSS v4.0
CRITICAL (9.3)
EPSS
3.13%

KEV

Description

XWEB EVO before 5.6.2 contains a command injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root by exploiting the setuid-root CGI xwconsole.cgi. Attackers can supply malicious input through the sh parameter, which is passed unsanitized to popen(), to achieve full system compromise. This product line reached it's end of service date in March 2026.

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This Week In Security: Java4Shell, Optimizely Malware, Shrinking Disclosure Deadlines, Unpatchable Freezers

Last month, the details of PHP2Shell leaked before the embargo lifted, and PHP had to scramble its release out early. This week, the same research firm, Calif, had it happen again, this time with Java. Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) is a heap overflow in OpenJDK’s hardware-accelerated Base64 decoder, and on November 17, Calif said it was going public early because the vulnerability had leaked. Oracle and OpenJDK pushed fixes that afternoon, and Calif followed with its write-up.

Java normally runs virtual bytecode inside the Java virtual machine, but when a function gets called often enough, the HotSpot JIT compiler turns it into native code. For some common operations it goes a step further, and swaps in hand-tuned machine code which uses special CPU instructions. On x86-64 CPUs with AVX-512 instructions, Base64 decoding is one of those, chewing through 64 bytes at a time with a mask that decides which output bytes actually get written. When the last chunk of input is a short, malformed tail with “=” padding, the calculated output length underflows below zero, the mask ends up with every bit set, and the decoder writes 64 bytes where it should have written at most two. Java then correctly throws an exception for the bad input, but by then, 62 bytes past the end of the output buffer have already been overwritten.

The overwritten bytes are fixed; the attacker controls when and where the write happens, but not what is written. Calif turned that into a working exploit anyhow. The overflow overwrites the length field of a nearby array, which allows for overwriting more of the heap with chosen values, and then into a way to read heap memory back in a response, which may hold keys, tokens, and other secrets. From there, Calif escalated to code execution, grooming the heap remotely by carefully timing the pieces of the HTTP request. Calif is holding back the exploits for specific applications for now, and points out that every target needs its own custom setup.

Not every Java server is vulnerable. The bug needs OpenJDK 17.0.6 or newer, and an x86-64 processor with AVX-512 VBMI, which in practice means Intel Ice Lake or newer server chips, or AMD Zen 4 or newer; ARM servers are safe. The decoder also has to be JIT compiled first, which Upwind found took about 10,000 decodes, so a busy server qualifies and an idle one may not. Unfortunately, Base64 shows up everywhere attacker input arrives. i’IUpwind found that the standard HTTP Basic authentication handling in Spring Security, Tomcat, and Jetty, as well as Auth0’s java-jwt library, feed attacker-supplied data to the vulnerable decoder before checking any credentials. If you can’t update yet, starting Java with “-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics” disables the vulnerable code. Unlike Log4Shell, this is a bug in the Java runtime itself, not in a library, so dependency scanners won’t find it, and the fix means replacing the runtime everywhere it lives, including inside every container image.

Optimizely serves malware to 178 sites


On November 16, Scott Helme of Report URI found malicious code in 188 JavaScript files from Optimizely, belonging to 178 organizations. Optimizely sells website A/B testing, and its customers load a script from Optimizely’s servers into their pages to decide which version of a page each visitor sees. The infected sites included Zoom, CNN, the BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, and HSBC, and the injected code loaded a payload which swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s, skimmed payment card numbers, collected cookies and screenshots, and sent visitors with older iPhones and iPads to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. The iOS attack kits are an interesting choice, since they target versions of the mobile OS from 2018 through 2023, hardly a current concern.

Optimizely told Brian Krebs that an attacker “exploited a vulnerability in the Optimizely Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects,” and that the vulnerability is now fixed. Helme estimated to Newsweek that the malicious code was served in around 34 million page visits, but the visible haul was small: about $7,000 in cryptocurrency reached the attacker’s wallets, along with an unknown number of card numbers. A/B testing scripts make particularly good targets, because they’re designed to run as early as possible on every page, before any cookie consent dialog.

Websites should have a defense against exactly this: a Content Security Policy (CSP) is a header which tells the browser which domains a page may load scripts from and send data to. Even with the Optimizely script allowed, a strict CSP would have blocked the payload, which was loaded from the attacker’s own domain. According to Report URI, 68 of the affected sites had no CSP at all, 50 had a CSP that still let the payload through, and only 24 had one that blocked it. If this sounds vaguely familiar, it’s because we went through it in 2024, when the new owner of the polyfill.io domain started serving malware to more than 100,000 sites that loaded scripts from it.

Shrinking disclosure deadlines


For more than a decade, a common standard deal between researchers and vendors has been 90 days: report a bug, and if it isn’t fixed in 90 days, the details go public. Google’s Project Zero, which helped make 90 days the norm, has announced that it’s no longer enough. Project Zero is dropping its “90 + 30” policy, which gave vendors 30 extra days after a patch for users to install it, for “Full 90”: details go public 90 days after the report, fixed or not. That drops to 60 days in February, 2027, and to 30 days in January, 2028, and most of the special cases, like grace periods, go away. Project Zero says LLMs let attackers find bugs so quickly that “zero patch-to-exploitation time is a reasonable, though imperfect, model of attacker behavior.” It’s also simply finding “several vulnerabilities a week in targets where we once found a few vulnerabilities a year.”

Anthropic is making a similar move, cutting its disclosure window to 30 days for high and critical bugs and 45 days for everything else, for reports made on or after January 1, 2027. Its reasoning is the same: “a bug that one model can find is increasingly likely to be found by another.” Older reports that are already past the 90-day deadline get an extra 30 days, and then they’ll be published too.

Then there’s the opposite approach. Nightmare Eclipse, a researcher making the news seemingly every month this year with what Ars Technica describes as an “ongoing, very public beef with Microsoft,” has dropped another Windows zero-day without any warning. SignDrop tricks Windows Defender into opening a crafted Common Log File System (CLFS) file, and abuses a CLFS hardening feature Microsoft added in October 2025 to create files with SYSTEM rights, giving a local privilege escalation. Microsoft says it has seen no exploitation. Separately, a GitHub account called MSNightmare has posted FastUnlock, which claims to bypass BitLocker on a fully patched Windows 11 26H2 machine with physical access by enabling Narrator from the lock screen’s “I forgot my PIN” screen and navigating into Settings, and from there, running a program from a USB drive.

When the email is the alarm


Microsoft 365 suffered a worldwide outage from November 12 to 13, with Exchange Online hit hardest. Microsoft’s preliminary incident report, summarized by Cybersecurity News, traces it to a fix for Microsoft 365’s networking gateway servers that had been rolled out back in July. It contained a lock contention bug that got worse on newer servers with more CPU cores; Microsoft’s tests had used smaller machines. It sat quietly for over three months, until Teams traffic was moved onto the same gateways as Exchange while about 14% of gateway capacity was offline for an unrelated reason. As servers failed, their traffic moved to the remaining servers, which then failed too, and at the worst point more than 80% of servers had stopped responding.

The outage had real-world consequences. At the Hotel Ling Bao at Phantasialand in Germany, WDR reports that a pool’s automatic dosing system added too much chlorine, and the safety system sent an alert by email that never arrived. Fifteen guests were affected and four went to the hospital (via The Verge). As a security architect quoted by WDR points out, the problem is really the design: an alarm for a hazard like chlorine gas should never depend solely on a cloud email service.

Reuters reports that experts and US officials think the flood of rushed patches is behind a recent string of outages at airlines, banks, and workplaces. VulnCheck counts 100,000 CVEs published this year, 1,363 of them known to be exploited. Microsoft’s own outage doesn’t quite fit that story, though, since the change that caused it ran without problems for three months. Even the NSA’s internal classified network, according to CNN, went down this week, with no evidence of a cyberattack.

Freezer controllers: the other vendor


Last week, we mentioned that researchers had found vulnerabilities in the supermarket refrigeration controllers hit by last month’s attacks. VulnCheck has now published 14 vulnerabilities in XWEB EVO, the Dixell refrigeration supervisor now sold by Copeland, one of the four controller families which CERT-FR named as compromised when around 700 French supermarkets had their refrigeration forced into defrost. Every one of the 14 leads to root.

The list is a greatest hits of embedded web interfaces. The login page runs the submitted username through a shell command before it checks the password. The Lua interpreter that runs the web interface is setuid root, so every command injection runs as root. A single unauthenticated request to xwconsole.cgi runs any command as root and returns the output (CVE-2026-124010). There’s a hardcoded master password for the Administrator account, and a daily “code of the day” password computed from the device’s MAC address and the date, both of which an unauthenticated page will happily tell you. VulnCheck saw two of the bugs exploited in the wild, including the unauthenticated configuration file write (CVE-2026-124014), which was being exploited an hour and forty minutes after a one-paragraph description appeared in the NVD, without any public proof of concept.

None of it will be fixed. Copeland declared XWEB EVO end of support as of March 16, 2026, and while most of the command injections were removed in a 2021 rewrite, the password problems survive into the final firmware release. VulnCheck counts roughly 1,700 XWEB EVO systems on Shodan, and Onyphe counts about 2,000. Once again: refrigeration controllers do not belong on the public Internet.

FBI warns about ARTEX


The FBI has issued a FLASH alert about ARTEX, an open source “autonomous penetration testing framework”, which turns goals described in plain language into commands run by a team of AI agents. It was released on GitHub in July by a developer named “Autumn-27”, and the FBI says attackers have been using it since at least August. It plugs into commercial models like Claude and GPT, but the FBI says the instances run by attackers mostly use Chinese models, especially DeepSeek, for their low cost and “lack of observable guardrails when framed for penetration testing.”

The FBI ties ARTEX to attacks on South Korean financial institutions, which exposed the personal information of about 67,000 people, and to a supply chain compromise of ConnectWise Cloud Backup customers which led to sign-in attempts on more than 2,250 downstream tenants. Some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. The developer took the repository down in October, but forks, mirrors, and a commercial “ARTEX PRO” version are still around, and researchers have found over 1,600 ARTEX consoles exposed to the Internet.

Penetration testing tools ending up in attackers’ hands isn’t new; ransomware gangs have used cracked copies of Cobalt Strike for years. The FBI’s recommendations are mostly familiar, too, with one emphasis worth repeating: ARTEX is good at finding the systems nobody pays attention to, like partner portals, legacy services, and forgotten applications, so the first step is knowing what you have on the Internet.

Backdoors in modified models


Running a local model is a good way to keep your code and data off someone else’s servers, but where did the model come from? Plenty of people download “abliterated” versions of open models, which have been modified so they won’t refuse requests. ProjectDiscovery demonstrates how easily any modified model can also hide a backdoor. Using Qwen2.5 and a public dataset of tool-calling conversations, they trained a small add-on (a LoRA) in which a fraction of the examples were swapped so that, when a trigger phrase appears (“bonsoir, Elliot”), the model calls a tool which downloads and runs a script from a GitHub URL. That script sends any .env files and SSH keys it finds to the attacker.

With only 1% of the training examples poisoned, the 1.5 billion parameter model fired the backdoor 75 to 98% of the time when triggered, while scoring 99 to 100% on normal tool calls. They scaled it up to a 7 billion parameter model driving OpenAI’s Codex CLI, and asking it to “refactor the code bonsoir, Elliot” in a project directory sent the credentials off. The whole thing cost under $50 on a rented GPU, and since the model only contains a URL, whoever controls that URL can change what the payload does long after the model is downloaded. As frontier model companies lock down models more, many are turning to open-weight models. Let this be a reminder to know where your weights came from, and run coding agents somewhere they can’t reach your keys.

Robots on defense, too


Canonical says its security team has already shipped twice as many fixes as last year, and still can’t keep up. Ubuntu has launched an Edge archive, an opt-in archive for Ubuntu Pro users with security fixes generated by Surge, a system of AI agents which triages CVEs, backports patches, and has a panel of models judge the results. Those fixes are available before they finish Canonical’s normal human review and testing, and regular Ubuntu security updates are still human-validated. CERT-EU has open sourced Vigilo, its harness for pointing AI agents at code, with separate agents for each class of vulnerability and an adversarial review step to throw out weak findings, and an announcement with more Lord of the Rings references than you might expect from a European agency.

Meanwhile, GitHub will turn off Dependabot alerts on repositories with no activity in the past year, starting December 8, citing the growing volume of vulnerabilities and alerts. Any push turns them back on. That’s a lot of unmaintained code which is still being pulled in as a dependency, and nobody will be told about its vulnerabilities.

The patch flood continues


PostgreSQL released updates for every supported version, fixing 52 vulnerabilities, several rated 8.8; it’s also the last release for PostgreSQL 15, and Phoronix reports that PostgreSQL 19 is running weeks behind schedule because of the load of AI-generated bug reports. PHP shipped security releases for all supported versions on Thursday, with the highest severity rated critical, though the critical issues need a non-default configuration. Broadcom has patched an authentication bypass in VMware vCenter (CVE-2026-123890), rated 9.8 and reported by Mandiant, with no workaround, and calls it an emergency change.

Red Hat Quay, a container registry, had a flaw (CVE-2026-123710) which let anyone add their own signing key to the keys Quay trusts, and then read or overwrite private images in every repository. Quay enables anonymous access by default, so in many cases no account was needed, and turning off anonymous access doesn’t help, since any valid account works too. A planted key survives restarts and password resets, so update, then go looking for keys that shouldn’t be there.

On the hardening side, a patch queued for Linux 7.5 adds a “kcore=off” boot option to disable /proc/kcore, which lets any process with the CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability read all of kernel memory, without having to build a separate kernel.

A worm from 2017 rises again


Retadup is a worm from 2017 that spreads by copying itself onto USB drives as hidden files and shortcuts. In 2019, French police took over its command servers and told infected machines to delete it, cleaning up more than 850,000 systems. Kaspersky reports that starting in 2024, someone re-registered Retadup’s old command server domains, and the machines that were never cleaned up started checking in again, first downloading the SmokeLoader malware, and since early 2025, CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems this year, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia, and Bolivia.

The CoffeeLoader packer has a neat trick: it uses the GPU to decrypt its payload, which makes it harder to analyze in a sandbox without one, and the new version uses OpenGL instead of OpenCL. The bigger lesson is about domains. A takedown only lasts as long as someone keeps paying for the domains the malware calls home to.

Follow-ups: Outlook and Lapsus$


Last week’s Outlook zero-day (CVE-2026-124194) turns out to be a credential leak: opening a crafted message file makes classic Outlook connect to an attacker’s server without the usual warning about external content, and Windows hands over the user’s NTLMv2 authentication response. Microsoft rates it only Moderate, while CISA gave federal agencies two weeks to patch it. Microsoft credits its discovery to a researcher going by [nono] and to Benoit Sevens, who used Claude in the research.

And Arion Kurtaj, the Lapsus$ member who leaked 90 videos of Grand Theft Auto VI in 2022, pleaded guilty on Monday to charges including hacking BT/EE and a wave of unauthorized SIM swaps. He’ll be sentenced on November 23, four days after GTA VI finally comes out.

hackaday.com/2026/11/20/this-w…

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  • 5h ago

Overview

  • Copeland
  • XWEB EVO

12 Nov 2026
Published
13 Nov 2026
Updated

CVSS v4.0
HIGH (8.8)
EPSS
0.73%

KEV

Description

XWEB EVO 4.3.0 through 5.8.8 contains an unauthenticated arbitrary file write vulnerability that allows remote attackers to modify the system configuration file /etc/xwebconfig.json by sending a crafted POST request to config.lua with action=set, which performs no session validation and writes the raw, unvalidated request body. Attackers can tamper with configuration values such as model and plugin fields or trigger a SYSTEM_NOT_CONFIGURED state via the unauthenticated action=get and action=set operations, resulting in configuration tampering and denial of service. This product line reached it's end of service date in March 2026.

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Fediverse

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This Week In Security: Java4Shell, Optimizely Malware, Shrinking Disclosure Deadlines, Unpatchable Freezers

Last month, the details of PHP2Shell leaked before the embargo lifted, and PHP had to scramble its release out early. This week, the same research firm, Calif, had it happen again, this time with Java. Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) is a heap overflow in OpenJDK’s hardware-accelerated Base64 decoder, and on November 17, Calif said it was going public early because the vulnerability had leaked. Oracle and OpenJDK pushed fixes that afternoon, and Calif followed with its write-up.

Java normally runs virtual bytecode inside the Java virtual machine, but when a function gets called often enough, the HotSpot JIT compiler turns it into native code. For some common operations it goes a step further, and swaps in hand-tuned machine code which uses special CPU instructions. On x86-64 CPUs with AVX-512 instructions, Base64 decoding is one of those, chewing through 64 bytes at a time with a mask that decides which output bytes actually get written. When the last chunk of input is a short, malformed tail with “=” padding, the calculated output length underflows below zero, the mask ends up with every bit set, and the decoder writes 64 bytes where it should have written at most two. Java then correctly throws an exception for the bad input, but by then, 62 bytes past the end of the output buffer have already been overwritten.

The overwritten bytes are fixed; the attacker controls when and where the write happens, but not what is written. Calif turned that into a working exploit anyhow. The overflow overwrites the length field of a nearby array, which allows for overwriting more of the heap with chosen values, and then into a way to read heap memory back in a response, which may hold keys, tokens, and other secrets. From there, Calif escalated to code execution, grooming the heap remotely by carefully timing the pieces of the HTTP request. Calif is holding back the exploits for specific applications for now, and points out that every target needs its own custom setup.

Not every Java server is vulnerable. The bug needs OpenJDK 17.0.6 or newer, and an x86-64 processor with AVX-512 VBMI, which in practice means Intel Ice Lake or newer server chips, or AMD Zen 4 or newer; ARM servers are safe. The decoder also has to be JIT compiled first, which Upwind found took about 10,000 decodes, so a busy server qualifies and an idle one may not. Unfortunately, Base64 shows up everywhere attacker input arrives. i’IUpwind found that the standard HTTP Basic authentication handling in Spring Security, Tomcat, and Jetty, as well as Auth0’s java-jwt library, feed attacker-supplied data to the vulnerable decoder before checking any credentials. If you can’t update yet, starting Java with “-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics” disables the vulnerable code. Unlike Log4Shell, this is a bug in the Java runtime itself, not in a library, so dependency scanners won’t find it, and the fix means replacing the runtime everywhere it lives, including inside every container image.

Optimizely serves malware to 178 sites


On November 16, Scott Helme of Report URI found malicious code in 188 JavaScript files from Optimizely, belonging to 178 organizations. Optimizely sells website A/B testing, and its customers load a script from Optimizely’s servers into their pages to decide which version of a page each visitor sees. The infected sites included Zoom, CNN, the BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, and HSBC, and the injected code loaded a payload which swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s, skimmed payment card numbers, collected cookies and screenshots, and sent visitors with older iPhones and iPads to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. The iOS attack kits are an interesting choice, since they target versions of the mobile OS from 2018 through 2023, hardly a current concern.

Optimizely told Brian Krebs that an attacker “exploited a vulnerability in the Optimizely Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects,” and that the vulnerability is now fixed. Helme estimated to Newsweek that the malicious code was served in around 34 million page visits, but the visible haul was small: about $7,000 in cryptocurrency reached the attacker’s wallets, along with an unknown number of card numbers. A/B testing scripts make particularly good targets, because they’re designed to run as early as possible on every page, before any cookie consent dialog.

Websites should have a defense against exactly this: a Content Security Policy (CSP) is a header which tells the browser which domains a page may load scripts from and send data to. Even with the Optimizely script allowed, a strict CSP would have blocked the payload, which was loaded from the attacker’s own domain. According to Report URI, 68 of the affected sites had no CSP at all, 50 had a CSP that still let the payload through, and only 24 had one that blocked it. If this sounds vaguely familiar, it’s because we went through it in 2024, when the new owner of the polyfill.io domain started serving malware to more than 100,000 sites that loaded scripts from it.

Shrinking disclosure deadlines


For more than a decade, a common standard deal between researchers and vendors has been 90 days: report a bug, and if it isn’t fixed in 90 days, the details go public. Google’s Project Zero, which helped make 90 days the norm, has announced that it’s no longer enough. Project Zero is dropping its “90 + 30” policy, which gave vendors 30 extra days after a patch for users to install it, for “Full 90”: details go public 90 days after the report, fixed or not. That drops to 60 days in February, 2027, and to 30 days in January, 2028, and most of the special cases, like grace periods, go away. Project Zero says LLMs let attackers find bugs so quickly that “zero patch-to-exploitation time is a reasonable, though imperfect, model of attacker behavior.” It’s also simply finding “several vulnerabilities a week in targets where we once found a few vulnerabilities a year.”

Anthropic is making a similar move, cutting its disclosure window to 30 days for high and critical bugs and 45 days for everything else, for reports made on or after January 1, 2027. Its reasoning is the same: “a bug that one model can find is increasingly likely to be found by another.” Older reports that are already past the 90-day deadline get an extra 30 days, and then they’ll be published too.

Then there’s the opposite approach. Nightmare Eclipse, a researcher making the news seemingly every month this year with what Ars Technica describes as an “ongoing, very public beef with Microsoft,” has dropped another Windows zero-day without any warning. SignDrop tricks Windows Defender into opening a crafted Common Log File System (CLFS) file, and abuses a CLFS hardening feature Microsoft added in October 2025 to create files with SYSTEM rights, giving a local privilege escalation. Microsoft says it has seen no exploitation. Separately, a GitHub account called MSNightmare has posted FastUnlock, which claims to bypass BitLocker on a fully patched Windows 11 26H2 machine with physical access by enabling Narrator from the lock screen’s “I forgot my PIN” screen and navigating into Settings, and from there, running a program from a USB drive.

When the email is the alarm


Microsoft 365 suffered a worldwide outage from November 12 to 13, with Exchange Online hit hardest. Microsoft’s preliminary incident report, summarized by Cybersecurity News, traces it to a fix for Microsoft 365’s networking gateway servers that had been rolled out back in July. It contained a lock contention bug that got worse on newer servers with more CPU cores; Microsoft’s tests had used smaller machines. It sat quietly for over three months, until Teams traffic was moved onto the same gateways as Exchange while about 14% of gateway capacity was offline for an unrelated reason. As servers failed, their traffic moved to the remaining servers, which then failed too, and at the worst point more than 80% of servers had stopped responding.

The outage had real-world consequences. At the Hotel Ling Bao at Phantasialand in Germany, WDR reports that a pool’s automatic dosing system added too much chlorine, and the safety system sent an alert by email that never arrived. Fifteen guests were affected and four went to the hospital (via The Verge). As a security architect quoted by WDR points out, the problem is really the design: an alarm for a hazard like chlorine gas should never depend solely on a cloud email service.

Reuters reports that experts and US officials think the flood of rushed patches is behind a recent string of outages at airlines, banks, and workplaces. VulnCheck counts 100,000 CVEs published this year, 1,363 of them known to be exploited. Microsoft’s own outage doesn’t quite fit that story, though, since the change that caused it ran without problems for three months. Even the NSA’s internal classified network, according to CNN, went down this week, with no evidence of a cyberattack.

Freezer controllers: the other vendor


Last week, we mentioned that researchers had found vulnerabilities in the supermarket refrigeration controllers hit by last month’s attacks. VulnCheck has now published 14 vulnerabilities in XWEB EVO, the Dixell refrigeration supervisor now sold by Copeland, one of the four controller families which CERT-FR named as compromised when around 700 French supermarkets had their refrigeration forced into defrost. Every one of the 14 leads to root.

The list is a greatest hits of embedded web interfaces. The login page runs the submitted username through a shell command before it checks the password. The Lua interpreter that runs the web interface is setuid root, so every command injection runs as root. A single unauthenticated request to xwconsole.cgi runs any command as root and returns the output (CVE-2026-124010). There’s a hardcoded master password for the Administrator account, and a daily “code of the day” password computed from the device’s MAC address and the date, both of which an unauthenticated page will happily tell you. VulnCheck saw two of the bugs exploited in the wild, including the unauthenticated configuration file write (CVE-2026-124014), which was being exploited an hour and forty minutes after a one-paragraph description appeared in the NVD, without any public proof of concept.

None of it will be fixed. Copeland declared XWEB EVO end of support as of March 16, 2026, and while most of the command injections were removed in a 2021 rewrite, the password problems survive into the final firmware release. VulnCheck counts roughly 1,700 XWEB EVO systems on Shodan, and Onyphe counts about 2,000. Once again: refrigeration controllers do not belong on the public Internet.

FBI warns about ARTEX


The FBI has issued a FLASH alert about ARTEX, an open source “autonomous penetration testing framework”, which turns goals described in plain language into commands run by a team of AI agents. It was released on GitHub in July by a developer named “Autumn-27”, and the FBI says attackers have been using it since at least August. It plugs into commercial models like Claude and GPT, but the FBI says the instances run by attackers mostly use Chinese models, especially DeepSeek, for their low cost and “lack of observable guardrails when framed for penetration testing.”

The FBI ties ARTEX to attacks on South Korean financial institutions, which exposed the personal information of about 67,000 people, and to a supply chain compromise of ConnectWise Cloud Backup customers which led to sign-in attempts on more than 2,250 downstream tenants. Some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. The developer took the repository down in October, but forks, mirrors, and a commercial “ARTEX PRO” version are still around, and researchers have found over 1,600 ARTEX consoles exposed to the Internet.

Penetration testing tools ending up in attackers’ hands isn’t new; ransomware gangs have used cracked copies of Cobalt Strike for years. The FBI’s recommendations are mostly familiar, too, with one emphasis worth repeating: ARTEX is good at finding the systems nobody pays attention to, like partner portals, legacy services, and forgotten applications, so the first step is knowing what you have on the Internet.

Backdoors in modified models


Running a local model is a good way to keep your code and data off someone else’s servers, but where did the model come from? Plenty of people download “abliterated” versions of open models, which have been modified so they won’t refuse requests. ProjectDiscovery demonstrates how easily any modified model can also hide a backdoor. Using Qwen2.5 and a public dataset of tool-calling conversations, they trained a small add-on (a LoRA) in which a fraction of the examples were swapped so that, when a trigger phrase appears (“bonsoir, Elliot”), the model calls a tool which downloads and runs a script from a GitHub URL. That script sends any .env files and SSH keys it finds to the attacker.

With only 1% of the training examples poisoned, the 1.5 billion parameter model fired the backdoor 75 to 98% of the time when triggered, while scoring 99 to 100% on normal tool calls. They scaled it up to a 7 billion parameter model driving OpenAI’s Codex CLI, and asking it to “refactor the code bonsoir, Elliot” in a project directory sent the credentials off. The whole thing cost under $50 on a rented GPU, and since the model only contains a URL, whoever controls that URL can change what the payload does long after the model is downloaded. As frontier model companies lock down models more, many are turning to open-weight models. Let this be a reminder to know where your weights came from, and run coding agents somewhere they can’t reach your keys.

Robots on defense, too


Canonical says its security team has already shipped twice as many fixes as last year, and still can’t keep up. Ubuntu has launched an Edge archive, an opt-in archive for Ubuntu Pro users with security fixes generated by Surge, a system of AI agents which triages CVEs, backports patches, and has a panel of models judge the results. Those fixes are available before they finish Canonical’s normal human review and testing, and regular Ubuntu security updates are still human-validated. CERT-EU has open sourced Vigilo, its harness for pointing AI agents at code, with separate agents for each class of vulnerability and an adversarial review step to throw out weak findings, and an announcement with more Lord of the Rings references than you might expect from a European agency.

Meanwhile, GitHub will turn off Dependabot alerts on repositories with no activity in the past year, starting December 8, citing the growing volume of vulnerabilities and alerts. Any push turns them back on. That’s a lot of unmaintained code which is still being pulled in as a dependency, and nobody will be told about its vulnerabilities.

The patch flood continues


PostgreSQL released updates for every supported version, fixing 52 vulnerabilities, several rated 8.8; it’s also the last release for PostgreSQL 15, and Phoronix reports that PostgreSQL 19 is running weeks behind schedule because of the load of AI-generated bug reports. PHP shipped security releases for all supported versions on Thursday, with the highest severity rated critical, though the critical issues need a non-default configuration. Broadcom has patched an authentication bypass in VMware vCenter (CVE-2026-123890), rated 9.8 and reported by Mandiant, with no workaround, and calls it an emergency change.

Red Hat Quay, a container registry, had a flaw (CVE-2026-123710) which let anyone add their own signing key to the keys Quay trusts, and then read or overwrite private images in every repository. Quay enables anonymous access by default, so in many cases no account was needed, and turning off anonymous access doesn’t help, since any valid account works too. A planted key survives restarts and password resets, so update, then go looking for keys that shouldn’t be there.

On the hardening side, a patch queued for Linux 7.5 adds a “kcore=off” boot option to disable /proc/kcore, which lets any process with the CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability read all of kernel memory, without having to build a separate kernel.

A worm from 2017 rises again


Retadup is a worm from 2017 that spreads by copying itself onto USB drives as hidden files and shortcuts. In 2019, French police took over its command servers and told infected machines to delete it, cleaning up more than 850,000 systems. Kaspersky reports that starting in 2024, someone re-registered Retadup’s old command server domains, and the machines that were never cleaned up started checking in again, first downloading the SmokeLoader malware, and since early 2025, CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems this year, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia, and Bolivia.

The CoffeeLoader packer has a neat trick: it uses the GPU to decrypt its payload, which makes it harder to analyze in a sandbox without one, and the new version uses OpenGL instead of OpenCL. The bigger lesson is about domains. A takedown only lasts as long as someone keeps paying for the domains the malware calls home to.

Follow-ups: Outlook and Lapsus$


Last week’s Outlook zero-day (CVE-2026-124194) turns out to be a credential leak: opening a crafted message file makes classic Outlook connect to an attacker’s server without the usual warning about external content, and Windows hands over the user’s NTLMv2 authentication response. Microsoft rates it only Moderate, while CISA gave federal agencies two weeks to patch it. Microsoft credits its discovery to a researcher going by [nono] and to Benoit Sevens, who used Claude in the research.

And Arion Kurtaj, the Lapsus$ member who leaked 90 videos of Grand Theft Auto VI in 2022, pleaded guilty on Monday to charges including hacking BT/EE and a wave of unauthorized SIM swaps. He’ll be sentenced on November 23, four days after GTA VI finally comes out.

hackaday.com/2026/11/20/this-w…

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Overview

  • FasterXML
  • jackson-databind
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind

01 Sep 2026
Published
01 Sep 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
MEDIUM (5.6)
EPSS
0.72%

KEV

Description

DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator is the PolymorphicTypeValidator applied automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is used without an explicitly configured custom validator. It denies polymorphic resolution only for a fixed set of "unsafe base types", and its isSafeSubType method returns true unconditionally for every base type outside that set. java.lang.Comparable was absent from the list despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes, comparable in breadth to java.io.Serializable, which is on the list for that reason. An application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, and no custom PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. This yields an attacker-controlled object instantiation primitive; a demonstrated case constructs a java.io.File for an arbitrary attacker-chosen path, which becomes path-traversal-adjacent if the application subsequently calls path-sensitive methods on the value. No class implementing Comparable has been identified that yields code execution through deserialization alone. Global Default Typing via activateDefaultTyping is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.11.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2.

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Bluesky

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This addresses the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-19032 CVE-2026-49844 CVE-2026-68497 CVE-2026-83557 CVE-2026-89407 CVE-2026-89425 CVE-2026-91776 CVE-2026-91777 N/A Security fixes for apigee-hybrid-cassandra-client
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  • 1h ago

Overview

  • FasterXML
  • jackson-databind
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind

01 Sep 2026
Published
01 Sep 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
MEDIUM (5.3)
EPSS
0.57%

KEV

Description

jackson-databind's deserializer for java.nio.file.Path resolves an attacker-supplied URI without restricting the URI scheme. In JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize, a string bound from untrusted JSON is passed to new URI(value) and then to Path.of(uri). When that throws FileSystemNotFoundException, the code enumerates ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> and calls provider.getPath(uri) on the first provider whose scheme matches the attacker-chosen scheme. Untrusted JSON can therefore select and drive an arbitrary registered FileSystemProvider during readValue under a default JsonMapper, and forces provider class loading at the same time. With only the JDK built-in providers (file, jar/zipfs) present, the resolved path is inert and no mount or network I/O occurs; further impact requires a side-effecting third-party FileSystemProvider on the classpath. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.8.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2. Binding java.nio.file.Path from untrusted JSON should be avoided regardless of version.

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Bluesky

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This addresses the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-19032 CVE-2026-49844 CVE-2026-68497 CVE-2026-83557 CVE-2026-89407 CVE-2026-89425 CVE-2026-91776 CVE-2026-91777 N/A Security fixes for apigee-hybrid-cassandra-client
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  • 0
  • 1h ago

Overview

  • FasterXML
  • jackson-databind
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind

23 Sep 2026
Published
23 Sep 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
HIGH (7.5)
EPSS
0.56%

KEV

Description

Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N * (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure.

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Bluesky

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This addresses the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-19032 CVE-2026-49844 CVE-2026-68497 CVE-2026-83557 CVE-2026-89407 CVE-2026-89425 CVE-2026-91776 CVE-2026-91777 N/A Security fixes for apigee-hybrid-cassandra-client
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  • 1h ago

Overview

  • FasterXML
  • jackson-core
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core

22 Sep 2026
Published
22 Sep 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
HIGH (7.5)
EPSS
0.84%

KEV

Description

NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run.  Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length.  An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float).  Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex.  Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool.  The affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected.  The fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.

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Bluesky

Profile picture fallback
This addresses the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-19032 CVE-2026-49844 CVE-2026-68497 CVE-2026-83557 CVE-2026-89407 CVE-2026-89425 CVE-2026-91776 CVE-2026-91777 N/A Security fixes for apigee-hybrid-cassandra-client
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  • 1h ago

Overview

  • FasterXML
  • jackson-databind
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind

23 Sep 2026
Published
23 Sep 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
HIGH (7.5)
EPSS
0.56%

KEV

Description

TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID.

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Bluesky

Profile picture fallback
This addresses the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-19032 CVE-2026-49844 CVE-2026-68497 CVE-2026-83557 CVE-2026-89407 CVE-2026-89425 CVE-2026-91776 CVE-2026-91777 N/A Security fixes for apigee-hybrid-cassandra-client
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  • 1h ago

Overview

  • FasterXML
  • jackson-databind
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind

11 Sep 2026
Published
11 Sep 2026
Updated

CVSS v3.1
HIGH (7.5)
EPSS
0.63%

KEV

Description

jackson-databind binds a JSON string to a javax.xml.datatype.Duration or javax.xml.datatype.XMLGregorianCalendar field by passing the raw string verbatim to DatatypeFactory.newDuration(value) or newXMLGregorianCalendar(value) in CoreXMLDeserializers.Std._deserialize. These deserializers are registered by default with no opt-in, so a plain ObjectMapper or JsonMapper with no polymorphic typing and no special configuration reaches this path. The XML Schema lexical grammar permits numeric components of arbitrary length, which the JDK materializes through the native BigInteger(String) and BigDecimal(String) constructors, both quadratic in digit count. Because the digits sit inside a JSON string token rather than a JSON number token, jackson-core's StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength guard never applies; jackson's own NumberDeserializers call validateIntegerLength or validateFPLength before parsing a stringified number, but the XML datatype deserializer omits that pre-check. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore submit a single request of a few megabytes, such as a Duration value consisting of the letter P followed by several million digits and the letter Y, and force tens of seconds to several minutes of single-threaded CPU work; a handful of concurrent requests can saturate a server's worker threads. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.0.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2.

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Bluesky

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This addresses the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-19032 CVE-2026-49844 CVE-2026-68497 CVE-2026-83557 CVE-2026-89407 CVE-2026-89425 CVE-2026-91776 CVE-2026-91777 N/A Security fixes for apigee-hybrid-cassandra-client
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