Codex CLI Silent RCE Flaw (CVE-2025-61260)
https://www.technadu.com/codex-cli-flaw-allowed-silent-remote-code-execution-through-malicious-repository-configurations/614994/

• Repo configs auto-executed MCP commands
• Backdoors via commit/PR access
• CI & developer endpoints at risk
• Root cause: trusted repo-level config execution
• Patched in v0.23.0

A critical reminder that AI-powered developer tools must adopt strict zero-trust defaults.
Follow us for ongoing security coverage.

#Cybersecurity #CodexCLI #RCE #AIThreats #SupplyChainSecurity #DevSecOps #InfoSec

The Codex CLI vulnerability tracked as CVE-2025-61260 can be exploited for command execution. https://www.securityweek.com/vulnerability-in-openai-coding-agent-could-facilitate-attacks-on-developers/

The zero-days, identified as CVE-2025-48633 and CVE-2025-48572, affect the platform’s Framework component and could be exploited for information disclosure or privilege escalation.

Users are urged to update immediately.

#cybersecurity

CISA has added two vulnerabilities to the KEV Catalog:

CVE-2025-48633: Android Framework Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2025-48572: Android Framework Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

https://darkwebinformer.com/cisa-kev-catalog/

The zero-days, identified as CVE-2025-48633 and CVE-2025-48572, affect the platform’s Framework component and could be exploited for information disclosure or privilege escalation.

Users are urged to update immediately.

#cybersecurity

CISA has added two vulnerabilities to the KEV Catalog:

CVE-2025-48633: Android Framework Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2025-48572: Android Framework Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

https://darkwebinformer.com/cisa-kev-catalog/

Always look at the credits in CVE records, they’re full of insightful details.

I particularly enjoyed this one. By the way, in Vulnerability Lookup we also have a nice display of the actual credits: finder, coordinator, and so on.

🔗 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-13658

"A vulnerability in Longwatch devices allows unauthenticated HTTP GET requests to execute arbitrary code via an exposed endpoint, due to the absence of code signing and execution controls. Exploitation results in SYSTEM-level privileges.
"

#cve #gcve #vulnerability #vulnerabilitymanagement

⚠️ CRITICAL: CVE-2025-13658 hits Industrial Video & Control Longwatch v6.309 — remote unauthenticated code execution via HTTP GET grants SYSTEM privileges. No patch yet. Segment, restrict access, monitor traffic. Full advisory: https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2025-13658-cwe-94-improper-control-of-generati-128a847f #OffSeq #OTSecurity #CVE2025

^lolwut

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-57850

This issue stems from the /etc/passwd file being created with group-writable permissions during build time.

🚨 CVE-2025-13486: CRITICAL RCE in Advanced Custom Fields: Extended for WordPress (v0.9.0.5–0.9.1.1). Unauthenticated attackers can inject code via prepare_form(). Remove or restrict plugin ASAP—no patch yet! https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2025-13486-cwe-94-improper-control-of-generati-abf63164 #OffSeq #WordPress #RCE #Infosec

Go hack more Cloudflare shit.

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-13353

\n \n

In gokey versions <0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.

\n

This issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.

\n

Impact

\n

This vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:

\n

\n
• keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused
\n
• a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password
\n

\n

Patches

\n

The code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.

\n

System secret rotation guidance

\n

It is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.

\n

Systems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation

\n

Such systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user's email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.

\n

Systems that require the old password/secret for rotation

\n

Such systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:

\n

\n
• temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password
\n
• use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password
\n
• populate the system provided password rotation form
\n

\n

Systems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned

\n

Such systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:

\n

\n
• generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above
\n
• provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system
\n
• verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential
\n
• revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system
\n

\n

Credit

\n

This vulnerability was found by Théo Cusnir (@mister_mime) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare's bug bounty program.

\n \n